Airstrip One

Action by example - 7th May 2003, 11.17

There is an argument that other European countries are impressed by Britain's immeasurable increase in influence following teh deployment of a supporting force in the Iraqi war. Geoffrey Wawro in the national Review takes up the cudgels on the part of Italy:

Talk of needles, tokens, and asymmetry turned my thoughts to the British in the Gulf and around Basra — to the way a single naval and amphibious task group and an armored division had given crucial support to the American war effort, securing Iraq's second city and principal oil fields against stiff opposition. If the Italians continue to evolve in this direction, I reflected, we can truly move the world.

If you look at Poland's role within the Iraq war, their "reward" now appears to bring them more headaches than resolutions. After the assignment of a geographical area for peacekeeping duties within Iraq, the Poles publicly made noises about burden-sharing with the Germans and other European partners. Such statements are not usually made without private assurances that their allies would be forthcoming with a positive answer. Germany's rebuke to Poland this evening and its restatement of the policy that German soldiers would only enter Iraq under a NATO or UN mandate must count as a diplomatic faux pas. The Germans have stated that they were not consulted but, as this was a planned meeting between the Poles, Germans, and Danes about their established shared military structures, the justification appears unconvincing.

This would not be the first time the German government has used foreign policy and embarrassed a close ally in order to publicly shore up its domestic popularity.

Do not confuse neoconservatism with neoconservatism - 5th May 2003, 21.15

An example of how the same word can be applied in very different contexts.

Fewsmith, Joseph. China since Tiananmen : the politics of transition. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001. Fewsmith puts the rise of neoconservatism and nationalism in China today into historical context, and he contrasts it with the growing pluralization of Chinese society and governance. Fewsmith depicts the growing tensions between these two trends as China's version of America's culture wars, but with arguably higher stakes. BOOKJACKET

It appears that neoconservatism in China is the term given by Sinologists to that strand of ideological thought which strives to replace socialism with nationalism as a legitimating strategy for the state.

CSIS: Euro-Focus - 5th May 2003, 18.00

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies provides a cogent overview of the winners and losers in Europe (pdf file).

"...the prevailing view in the United States is that the EU is a troubled and troubling union: troubled in terms of its internal divisions, and troubling in terms of the motivation that seems to underline the actions of its older members. As for Nato, the prevailing view is that it is a fading organization with a blocking minority of members who are not only unwilling but also broadly incapable and frankly irrelevant".

Simon Serfaty argues that there was a convergence of agendas on EU and NATO cooperation, cushioned by behind teh scenes support from the United States, during the NATO summit in Prague last autumn and at the EU summit in Copenhagen during December. This convergence no longer exists and individual countries within Europe work within the existing institutions whilst undertaking bilateral relationships that contravene the standards of governance supporting the common foreign and security policy. Yet, Washington may place more weight upon bilateral relationships than they can hold and misunderstand the constraints under which European nations function in their foreign policy. Serfaty recognises the Quartet underwriting the Middle East roadmap as a possible model for future cooperation. Where European nations agree more amongst themselves than with the United States, a corporate model may be invoked that presents a counterweight in particular areas of diplomacy.

Serfaty's recommendations that greater European unity would aid the United States by providing the opportunity for firmer institutional links may be opposed on the grounds that the Gaullist tendency within the EU has warped into anti-Americanism without any productive programme for solving Europe's weaknesses. However, he does indicate the possible diplomatic model that may be adopted from now on over issues like the Middle East, Iraq, the Balkans and so on.

Finnish opposition to a "closed defence core" - 5th May 2003, 11.49

The Finnish government has been one of the more vocal defenders of the rights of small countries within the EU and, interestingly, has linked this to opposing the creation of a "two speed" EU in security policy. Finland has a history of neutrality and has been willing to accept certain security guarantees within the EU, including "the establishment of an office of defence materiel, a statement of solidarity in the future EU constitution, and the expansion of crisis management".

They view the "closed defence core" as an importation of NATO's probles into the European Union and prefer to retain a common foreign and security policy that is open to all and structured on the grounds of flexibility. It appears that the "closed defence core" is having an impact upon the current division within the European Convention between the smaller and larger countries, stimulating new institutional alliance centred on the Franco-German motor.

German support for the European Army - 5th May 2003, 10.27

On the day that Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg were meeting to set up a prospective defence core within the EU, a paper was deliberately leaked to the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, containing support from German military planners for an EU army. Their plan was for German leadership in this role, the establishment of a full state security infrastructure and a seat at the United Nations for the EU (a goal that the federasts have in common with the neo-conservatives).

The British nuclear deterrant was flagged as a possible "sticking point for pooling European forces".