Airstrip One

As my previous post showed, the British presence in Basra is being scaled down. However, the Foreign Office and Department for International Development have decided to depart early, leaving a sordid legacy. This has placed the reconstruction efforts in Basra under a cloud. Remember that these efforts were focussed in areas that were not controlled by militias. Now, it appears that more money has been lavished on the British consulate than on reconstruction in the city itself:

The Foreign Office and Dfid operation in southern Iraq has been criticised for the poor handling of economic and political regeneration in the area.

While £14 million has been spent on refurbishing the consulate, including a new portico, hardened roof defences and swimming pool, it has spent just £12.5 million on reconstruction that included repainting a tower in the city.

The palace, which is surrounded by a 30ft blast wall and graced with manicured lawns, is in the same fortified compound as 800 British infantry.

Such luxury within an impoverished city would leave a bitter taste with the locals, providing a tempting target for those who wish to gain support through mortar attacks. Now the FCO and DFID responds with evacuation. No doubt the usual suspects will be promoted, for their diplomatic handling of the locals.

For 'sophisticates' who attack the United States on the grounds that our imperial history allows us to administer the poor locals better, think again. Too many years in the European Union have turned our civil servants into venal incompetents and our politicians into parasites sucking the lens, whilst the Army sees their soldiers and their achievements pissed on.

The Independent reports that the British Army plans to hand over maysan province to the Iraqi security forces in January 2007 and halve the number of troops serving in Mesopotamia. Part of the strategy for completing this goal is a campaign of reconstruction, building schools and hospitals in Basra. This is part of the 'hearts and minds' brief that has worked for British troops in the past. Such a campaign relies upon defeating the enemy forces, with extreme violence, if necessary:

The decision to tackle the most peaceable areas of Basra first is designed to convince those in areas dominated by insurgents that the rebuilding programme is in their interest. Sources said that the next six months were crucial to the scheme's success.

If the nutters are not tackled and defeated, building schools becomes a short-term scuttle to give the insurgents target practice. By allowing the militias free rein in Basra, the government will point to a few photo-ops, bleat success, and then leave.

It is the hypocrisy with which the limited number of options that I dislike. Now, that the wheels have come off the government's 'two front' deployment, they are open to attack by the cash-starved armed forces, sick to death of being taken for granted. General Guthrie used an interview in The Observer to call the Affghanistan campaign "cuckoo". Whilst he defended Blair's actions, his contempt was aimed at the MOD apparatchiks who blithely waltzed without a consideration of Afghan history or Taleban resistance. When one remembers Reid's saying that not a shot would be fired....

"Anyone who thought this was going to be a picnic in Afghanistan - anyone who had read any history, anyone who knew the Afghans, or had seen the terrain, anyone who had thought about the Taliban resurgence, anyone who understood what was going on across the border in Baluchistan and Waziristan [should have known] - to launch the British army in with the numbers there are, while we're still going on in Iraq is cuckoo," Guthrie said.....

Guthrie said that civil servants and even some in the military were assuming that "Afghanistan and Iraq are something we're going to muddle through for another couple of years and then we'll be able to go back" to a period of relative calm.

"I don't see that happening," he told The Observer. "I think we're in an extremely volatile, dangerous world," he said. "It's no good governments saying we're going to keep out of these things. They don't always have the luxury of choice. The type of crisis is actually quite difficult to forecast. But sure enough, we are going to have crises. There is absolutely no reason to suppose that the world is going to settle down in the foreseeable future. We're not going to be allowed to graze in Elysian fields with the sun on our backs."

The calls for re-armament are getting stronger. The period of the peace dividend has ended, cashed in by Blair's penchant for a muscular liberal foreign policy. Yet, Guthrie's attack on the Ministry of Defence finds two political targets: the unimpressive John Reid, whose ego is continully punctured by the travails of the Home Office and Des Browne, who reels before the anger of the Armed Forces, no longer able to hold on expenditure and suffers the Treasury's displeasure.

Cross-posted to The Bewilderness

For those who supported the Iraq war (a band of merry men that doth include myself), one of the most damning aspects of the run-up to the invasion was the cynical and duplicitous campaign organised by the Blair administration to justify their claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. This running sore had still not run dry in the political landscape.

The Hutton report brought two aspects of this campaign to light: the close relationship between Number Ten and the intelligence services; a politicised relationship that reflected badly on both parties. The objective analysis of MI6 was cast into doubt and, their capability to deal with the Islamist threat, placed under question marks. Now the Ministry of Defence appears to be casting further dust into the eyes of both parties.

As leaked, MI6 ran an operation known as Rocking ham, a "spin unit", working in tandem with their US counterparts and supporting the theory that Blair signed up to the invasion during the autumn of 2002, a timeline never revealed to Parliament, monarch or nation.

The Sunday Herald has previously revealed the existence of two secret “spin units” operating within British and American intelligence and designed to concoct a false premise for war.

In Britain, Operation Rockingham collated questionable information supporting misleading claims about Saddam’s active WMD arsenal to back up the case for war. The British spies gathering the information – mainly from untrustworthy Iraqi defectors – knew the claims were either bogus or out of date. The information was used by the Blair government to persuade the British parliament and people that war with Iraq was a necessity.

The MOD argues that the information that these "spin units" collated was sourced from the Iraqi National Congress under Ahmed Chalabi, and that most of the disinformation was passed from Iranian intelligence. If true, the intelligence services were either duped or willing pawns:

Garry Hindle, head of terrorism and international homeland security and resilience at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies, said he had been aware of claims that the INC was feeding disinformation to the US as part of an Iranian intelligence operation for “a couple of years”.

“It is certainly significant for a senior MoD official to comment on this,” he added. “I would tentatively suggest that, given the close ties that existed between the Pentagon, the US administration and the INC, and the sidelining of the CIA and the State Department, that it may not necessarily be that ‘duping’ is the key, but rather a wilful acceptance of information that supported objectives or validated beliefs.”

Why did the Iranians wish to aid the coalition invasion of Iraq, when there was every probability of strategic encirclement? If the intelligence services were cognizant of, perhaps deliberately co-operating with the Iranian mullahs, what was the quid pro quo? An acceptance of Shiastan and carte blanche for the Sadr army to attain hegemony over Shia militias.

Whatever price was paid in Iraq, we should be grateful that the duplicitous incompetence of our homeland security has come to light, at the hands of a Ministry that views their handiwork with some scepticism, I suspect. They cocked up the possible threat from internal Islamist radicals in the 1990s, allowing the development of Londonistan. They encouraged a war that has succoured terrorism and converted Al-Qaeda from a base to a franchise. Iran is now resurgent and the British Army is overstretched, unable to maintain two fronts, and undermined by a sceptical public opinion at home.

That is a damning record for our intelligence services, now sullied by New Labour. Both politicians and securocrats have endangered us, their turncoat ranks closing in to protect skins at the expense of our lives. That will not be forgotten.

Now that the heavy conflicts of the summer at Sangin and Musa Qala are coming to a close, more stories about the pressure and strains suffered by the British Army are coming out through armed forces noticeboards and private emails. It is clear that equipment failures remain a drag to the operational effectiveness of our troops.

Troops revealed that they were engaged in all-out fighting, with ammunition running out, equipment malfunctioning and reinforcements and supplies failing to arrive. "Two days ago, we ran out of GPMG [general purpose machine gun] ammunition in our forward location," said an email to a Tory MP, Patrick Mercer.

"The Taleban were dodging around in great numbers at about 700m and firing at us from there from behind all sorts of cover. We ran out of LINK [the linked-up ammunition for a general-purpose machine gun] and we couldn't get any more in overnight because of the darkness and the weight of fire. We were within RPG range which they use superbly. We used our mortars to good effect, but, again, ammunition ran short."

Similar complaints came from another officer, who said that his troops' SA80 rifles melted in the heat. "You would go to pull the trigger and a piece of the gun would come away in your hand," he wrote. His force was also hampered by "a chronic lack of thermal imaging equipment, which allows you to plot the enemy at night. Without it you fight blind in a vast desert you don't know."

Communications equipment, including Harris 117 radios, which allow soldiers to call for help and back-up, was also being rationed, and their Land Rovers often broke down. "They were not made for battles in the desert," said the officer. "Every day, two or three vehicles were being repaired because axles were breaking under the strain. It made you an open target."

This is another black spot against Blair's administration, the Army prevailing because of their professional experience, not due to the fuck-ups of the MOD. Medals may be have been earned, but decent equipment would be a better reward.

Recent reports indicate that the British Army is retreating from Musa Qala after a truce with the Taliban allowing both sides to withdraw without losing face. This was negotiated with the aid of the local shura, the 'council of elders'. Such a withdrawal could amount to defeat, preventing the Kabul government from defending its presence and abandoning the objective of reconstruction, the original goal of the deployment. If such a withdrawal takes place at Sangin as well, questions have to be raised over the ability of the British or Canadians to achieve positive returns in the province of Helmand.